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There exists evidence in the social science literature that women may be more relationship-oriented,
may have higher standards of ethical behavior and may be more concerned with the common good than
men are. This would imply that women are more willing to sacriﬁce private proﬁtf o rt h ep u b l i cg o o d ,a n d
this would be especially important for political life. Many papers with ﬁeld data have found diﬀerences in
the corrupt activities of males and females, but given their diﬀerent insertion in the labor market and in
politics, it is not clear if the diﬀerences are due to diﬀerences in opportunities or real gender diﬀerences.
The aim of this paper is to see if women and men, facing the same situation behave in a diﬀerent way, as
suggested in the ﬁeld-data studies, or on the contrary, when women are in the same position as men they
behave in the same way. The results found in the experiment show that women are indeed less corrupt
than men. This suggests that increasing women’s participation in the labor force and politics would help
to reduce corruption.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A large stream of research papers has documented systematic gender diﬀerences in behavior. This evidence
suggests that women may be more relationship-oriented, may have higher standards of ethical behavior and
may be more concerned with the common good than men are1. This would imply that women are more
willing to sacriﬁce private proﬁt for the public good, and this would be especially important for political life.
Most criminologists agree that men are more likely to commit oﬀenses than females (Gottfredson and
Hirschi, 1990). They argue that the gender diﬀerences do not vary over time and countries, they start at
low ages and are maintained through the years, and the same patterns are observed in diﬀerent countries.
Moreover, crimes committed by men are more serious than those committed by women.
Moreover, there are papers with ﬁeld data that have found that women are less tolerant toward dishonest
behavior and that there exists a negative relation between women’s participation in politics and corruption.
It can be argued that the observed diﬀerence in behavior between women and men in the ﬁeld may be due
to other reasons than real gender diﬀerences in corrupt behavior, possible interference that can be controlled
in a laboratory experiment. One possible explanation for the observed diﬀerence, refers to the diﬀerent
degree of risk aversion of males and females, which was observed in many experiments2. It could be an
important reason given that corrupt behavior implies (almost) always a probability of being discovered and
thus punished. In the real world this probability is small but generally the punishment is severe. As will
be explained below, in my experiment I will control for risk aversion, trying to isolate the results from its
inﬂuence.
An alternative explanation for the observed diﬀerence is that women have entered the labor market and
politics much more recently than men, so that the gender diﬀerences may be due to diﬀerences in access to
networks of corruption, or in knowledge of how to get involved in corrupt activities. Thus, it may just be a
matter of time until women get involved in corrupt activities3. In my experiment there is no previous history,
given that subjects do not have experience in this kind of game, neither women nor men. Therefore this eﬀect
can be eliminated as an explanation of any diﬀerence observed in the experiment. A third explanation for
possible gender diﬀerences is that the higher participation of women in politics is determined by the presence
of a liberal democracy that promotes both gender equality and good governance. In the experiment, this
is ruled out given that it is going to be compared women’s and men’s behavior both in the same situation,
where they can freely choose what to do.
The aim of this paper is to see if women and men, facing the same situation behave in a diﬀerent way,
1See subsection 1.2.
2Croson and Gneezy (2004) review literature from psychology, sociology and economics, that indicate that women are more
risk averse than men. See subsection 1.2.
3Although this hypothesis is not supported by Torgler and Valev (2006), as is explained in subsection 1.1.
2as suggested in the empirical papers or, on the contrary, when women are in the same position as men
they behave in the same way. As explained in the Handbook on Fighting Corruption, "In broad terms,
corruption is the abuse of public oﬃce for private gain". In the context of this paper corrupt behavior will
refer to the manipulation of public oﬃcers’ decisions in exchange for bribes. The design of the experiment
tries to capture the characteristics of corrupt behavior: the reciprocity between the briber and the oﬃcial,
the negative externality over the public, and the probability of being discovered. The results found in the
experiment suggest that women are less corrupt than men, in line with the ﬁndings in the ﬁeld-data papers.
The paper is organized as follows, in the next subsection three ﬁeld-data papers dealing with gender and
corruption are reviewed. Subsections 1.2 and 1.3 give an overview of some papers on experiments on gender
diﬀerences and corruption, respectively. Section 2 explains the experiment design, section 3 presents the
results, and ﬁnally section 4 ﬁnishes with some conclusions.
1.1 Literature on corruption and gender with ﬁeld data
In this subsection well known ﬁeld-data papers dealing with the relation between women and corruption are
reviewed. Dollar et al (1999), Swamy et al. (2001), and Torgler and Valev (2006) conclude that men are
more involved in corrupt activities than women.
Some data sources are self-reported and others are corruption indexes. These papers study two main
topics, one is the acceptability of corrupt behavior by men and women, and the other is the relation between
women’s participation in politics and a corruption index, on a country level.
Dollar et al. (1999) analyze data for more than 100 countries, and ﬁnd a strong negative and statistically
signiﬁcant relation between the level of female participation in politics -measured by the percentage of seats
occupied by women in the lower and upper chambers- and a corruption index. They use the International
Country Risk Guide’s corruption index4. When estimating the relation, they control for variables such as
GDP, a civil liberties index, population, average years of schooling, openness to trade, regional dummies,
etc. They conclude that encouraging women to have a higher political participation may be for the beneﬁt
of the whole society.
Swamy et al. (2001) study the hypothesis that female participation in government would reduce corrup-
tion, using three diﬀerent data sources. The ﬁrst one is the World Value Surveys (WVS), which consists of
questions regarding attitudes in hypothetical situations in which there is room for dishonest behavior. Their
main interest is in the reaction to the situation where "someone is accepting a bribe in the course of their
duties", the subjects can say that it can "never be justiﬁed" up to "always be justiﬁe d " ,o na1t o1 0s c a l e .
Aggregating over all countries, they ﬁnd that there exist gender diﬀerences consisting in women being less
4They state that the ICRG’s corruption index is "meant to capture the likelihood that high government oﬃcials will demand
special payments, and the extend to which illegal payments are expected throughout low levels of government".
3tolerant toward dishonest or illegal activities than men. Moreover, they ﬁnd the same diﬀerence in almost
all countries, although the estimated eﬀects vary. When estimating, they control for marital status, age,
religion, and education, variables that are thought to inﬂuence someone’s acceptability of corruption.
The second data set they used, is a survey of enterprise owners and managers in Georgia5.T h e s ep e o p l e
were asked: "How frequently do the oﬃcials providing the service require unoﬃcial payments?". The possible
answers are from "Never" to "Always", on a 1 to 7 scale. They control for ﬁrm characteristics such as size,
scale of operations, sector, etc. The evidence they ﬁnd suggests a gender diﬀerential in involvement in
corruption, where men are found to be more involved.
These sources of information are both self-reported. The third data set they use is also subjective but
not self-reported, it is a cross-country data set6. With it, they ﬁnd that corruption is less prevalent where
women have more weight in politics and in the labor force. The participation of women is measured in
diﬀerent ways, arriving to very similar results. They measure it by the percentage of female legislators, the
percentage of female ministers and high level government bureaucrats, and ﬁn a l l yb yt h es h a r eo fw o m e ni n
the labor force. In the estimation, they control for the per capita income, the average education of adults,
the percentage of Catholics and Muslims, a political freedom index, etc.
In a recent paper, Torgler and Valev (2006) investigate empirically if women are more willing to be
compliant than men, and if there exist diﬀerences in behavior over time due to a cohort eﬀect (diﬀerences
in attitudes among similar age groups in diﬀerent time periods) or an age eﬀect (changing attitudes of the
same cohorts over time). Using the WVS and the European Values Survey that span the period from 1981
to 1999, they ﬁnd a strong gender eﬀect, women are more willing to comply than men, they are less likely
to agree that corruption and cheating on taxes can be justiﬁed. Moreover, there is no decay over time in
this gender diﬀerence. This ﬁnding contradicts the role theory that suggests that more equality of status
between men and women would lead to decreasing gender diﬀerences over time7.T h e yﬁnd an age eﬀect but
not a cohort eﬀect, also contradicting the role theory8. They control for diﬀerent variables like education,
marital status, the economic situation of the subjects, occupational status, individuals’ trust in the legal
system and in the parliament, etc.
5The ex soviet country.
6They use the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. It is based on diﬀerent information sources such as
investor surveys and assessments of country experts.
7The criminology literature also suggests that the role theory cannot explain diﬀerences in crime rates between men and
women (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990).
8See for example Nettler (1984).
41.2 Experiments on gender diﬀerences
There are many studies that document gender diﬀerences in behavior, although they yield contradictory
results. Some papers found diﬀerences -some in one direction and others in the opposite direction- and
others do not. In the following I review some papers which do ﬁnd diﬀerences and that analyze issues that
are important for the subject being studied in this paper.
Croson and Gneezy (2004) review the literature on gender diﬀerences in behavior related with risk
preferences, social preferences and competitive preferences. They show evidence of literature in psychology
and sociology that shows that women are more risk averse than men. They indicate that some tasks that
involve intellectual and physical risk generate larger gender gaps than others, as health risks like smoking.
They say that economics focuses on attitudes toward ﬁnancial risk. The economics evidence on the gender
gap is not as conclusive as in psychology and sociology. One possible explanation for the observed diﬀerence
in attitudes toward risk is related to the perception of risk, given that there exists experimental evidence
that says that men are more overconﬁdent than women. Nonetheless, it has been found that managers and
professional business persons are an exception. In this subpopulation there appears to be no gender gap in
risk attitudes.
In relation with social preferences, altruism, inequality-aversion, and reciprocity have been studied. In
their review, Croson and Gneezy (2004) report evidence in diﬀerent directions, and argue that this diﬀerence
may be due to the fact -suggested by psychology studies- that women are more responsive to social conditions.
Eckel and Grosssman (2000) review evidence from public-good, ultimatum and dictator experiments.
They ﬁnd that there is no convincing evidence of gender diﬀerences in behavior, but they ﬁnd some reg-
ularities in the data. When subjects are exposed to risk there is no signiﬁcant evidence of diﬀerences in
behavior, but when they are not exposed to risk, diﬀerences emerge. In this situation, women are less
individually-oriented and more socially-oriented. The results depend on the details of the payoﬀ structure
and the experimental procedures. Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) study diﬀerences in "demand for altru-
ism" in a dictator game, through variation in the level and price of giving. They ﬁnd that when the price of
altruism is high, women are more generous, while when the price is low men are more altruistic. Therefore,
the answer to their question "which is the fair sex?" depends on the price of giving. Men are more price
elastic and women more egalitarian. Song et al. (2004) analyze the gender diﬀerences in other-regarding
behavior when subjects are responsible for a group. They ﬁnd that men are less other-regarding when they
are acting in behalf of a group than when they are acting in their own behalf, while women do not exhibit
this diﬀerence.
There exists evidence of gender diﬀerences in attitudes toward competitions. Gneezy et al. (2003) ﬁnd
that men have a better performance in a more competitive environment, but women do not. This creates
a gender gap in the competitive environment -tournament payment scheme-, which does not exist in the
5non-competitive situation -piece rate payment-. Niederle and Vesterlund (2005) and Datta Gupta et al.
(2005) extended the Gneezy et al. (2003) setting by allowing the subjects to choose the payment scheme
that they want to have, the non-competitive piece rate or the competitive tournament, before performing a
real task. They ﬁnd that men are more likely than women to choose the competitive payment scheme. Men
are less inﬂuenced by the risk aversion degree in their election than women9,a n da r ei n ﬂuenced by their
co-participant’s gender, while women are not. They compete more when facing a male co-participant, and
when facing a woman they compete more if they believe that this woman competes too.
It can be concluded that women are more risk averse and choose less frequently to be in a competitive
environment. Moreover, depending on the circumstances, they are more generous (if the price of altruism is
high) and are more socially oriented (if they are not exposed to risk).
1.3 Experiments on corruption
Given the diﬃculty of collecting reliable ﬁeld data on corrupt activities due to the secrecy in which they take
place, in recent years the topic has been studied using laboratory experiments. Some research papers on
corruption using experiments are Abbink et al. (2002), Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002), Abbink (2004),
Abbink (2005b), Dusek et al.(2005). The ﬁrst three papers deal with bribery games; I follow their design
in this paper. The last two papers are surveys. Moreover, one paper that investigates if there exists gender
diﬀerences in the acceptability of corruption is also reviewed (Alatas et al., 2006).
Abbink et al. (2002) present the ﬁrst interactive experimental corruption game10. They model bribery
as a situation with "negative" reciprocity. They implement a two-player sequential game, where the ﬁrst
player -the potential briber- is interpreted as a businessman or a ﬁrm, and the second player as a public
oﬃcer. The ﬁrst player can send some amount of money to the second player in the hope of persuading
him/her to make a decision favorable to the former. This experiment has three diﬀerent treatments to
separate three characteristics of corruption: reciprocity (between the subjects involved in the activity),
negative externalities to others, and risk of being caught11. Their baseline is a pure reciprocity game used
9Datta Gupta et al. (2005) found that women who choose the competitive payment scheme are signiﬁcantly more risk loving
than those that choose the non-competitive scheme, while men who choose the competitive payment scheme are as risk loving
as those that choose the non-competitive scheme.
10There are papers that look for the factors that inﬂuence people’s corruptibility and therefore the experiments are not
interactive, e.g. Frank and Schulze (2000), Schulze and Frank (2003). They are diﬀerent from the experiment reported in this
paper, a bribery experiment, that focuses on the manipulation of a public oﬃcer’s decisions in exchange for bribes. In this
situation the experiment should be interactive given that one player is trying to manipulate the other’s decisions in his/her own
beneﬁt.
11The corrupt relation should be based on the trust and reciprocity between the involved subjects given that no binding
contracts are possible. Corruption implies a negative eﬀe c to v e rt h ep u b l i c ,a sw a ss h o w ni nm a n yd i ﬀerent studies, and it
implies a probability -generally small- of being discovered.
6as a control condition to compare with the other treatments. They add negative externalities in their second
treatment and an external risk in the third one. In the baseline they ﬁnd that the (non-desirable) relationship
can be established through trust and reciprocity. They ﬁnd similar results in the second treatment, meaning
that they do not ﬁnd evidence of any eﬀect of the negative externalities over other players, on the decision
making. But they do ﬁnd diﬀerences when a possibility of severe penalty is introduced, they observe less
reciprocal cooperation. The results suggest that harsh, low-probability punishment of corruption may be
very preventive.
In a paper on the eﬀects of staﬀ rotation, Abbink (2004) ﬁnds a strong eﬀect of changing the pairs
(briber-public oﬃcer) concluding that rotating the staﬀ would be an eﬀective way to ﬁght corruption12.I n
a following paper he analyzes the impact of fair salaries on corruption but fails to ﬁnd signiﬁcant eﬀects13.
One topic that is frequently discussed is a methodological aspect, namely, if instructions in bribery
experiments should be framed or not. In the previous papers instructions were written in neutral terms.
Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002) conducted the same experiment performed previously by Abbink et al.
(2002) but with loaded instructions14.T h e yd on o tﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences, and conclude that the game
is rather insensitive to the way it is presented to subjects.
For a complete coverage of laboratory experiments on corruption see the surveys by Abbink (2005b) and
Dusek et al. (2005).
Alatas et al. (2006) conduct an experiment to investigate if there exist gender diﬀerences in the accept-
ability of corruption, and to see if they diﬀer between countries. They conduct the experiment in Australia,
India, Indonesia, and Singapore. The experiment is a one-shot game and subjects play in groups of three,
one ﬁrm that can oﬀer a bribe, one public oﬃcial that can accept or reject the bribe, and one citizen that
can punish the other two players. They only ﬁnd gender diﬀerences in Australia and conclude that gender
diﬀerences are culture speciﬁc, given that they vary between countries. Moreover, they ﬁnd that males’
behavior does not diﬀer much between countries while women’s behavior does vary15. Although this paper
investigates a very similar subject as the present paper, there are important diﬀerences. First of all, Alatas
et al. (2006) focus on the acceptability of corruption and not on corrupt behavior in itself, given that the
public oﬃcial does not have more discretionary power than accepting or rejecting the bribe. Secondly, they
conducted a one-shot experiment and I conducted a 20-round experiment. I do it like this because I am
interested in research into corrupt behavior in a long-run relation between the briber and the oﬃcial, while
they do it one-shot because they are interested in investigating the willingness to punish corruption without
economic beneﬁt to the subject that can punish.
12Staﬀ rotation was a practice introduced by the German federal government.
13Abbink (2005a). They vary the wages of the "workers" aﬀected by the corruption.
14The diﬀerence between neutral and loaded instructions for this case will be explained in the following section.
15They argue that it may be due to the fact that women are more inﬂuenced by their cultural environment than men.
72 Experiment design
As a typical bribery experiment, I consider two participants, a ﬁrm (F) and a public oﬃcer (PO). The design
of the experiment tries to capture the characteristics of corrupt behavior16. The focus is on the manipulation
of a public oﬃcer’s decisions through the use of a bribe. Therefore, the ﬁrst player (F) is allowed to send some
amount of money to the second player (PO) in the hope of persuading him to make a decision favorable to the
former, although this decision has negative externalities over all the other participants of the experiment17.
The experiment was designed in completely neutral terms, following the design used by Abbink et al.
(2002). As explained before, Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2002) reproduced the experiment of Abbink et al.
(2002) -the one I follow- using, instead of neutral instructions, loaded ones, ﬁnding no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in subjects’ behavior. In the loaded case, subjects were told that a ﬁrm (Player 1 in my experiment) wanted
to run an industrial plant which causes negative consequences to the public, and the public oﬃcer (Player
2) had to decide whether to give the permission or not. The ﬁrm could make a private payment (a transfer
in my experiment) to inﬂuence the public oﬃcer. Moreover, in the instructions they explained that there
existed a probability of being "discovered". Therefore, it was pretty clear the corrupt situation. Given that
in this case they did not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in behavior, it can be understood that even using neutral
instructions, the corrupt situation is reﬂected. Therefore, I use Abbink et al. (2002)’s design with neutral
instructions.
The experiment was conducted at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona18 with undergraduate students
with diﬀerent majors. They were recruited by public advertisements posted throughout the campus.
The experiment consists of 20 rounds, and each round has 4 stages, in the ﬁrst two stages F has to decide
how many tokens to transfer to PO, if any, and in the other stages PO has to decide whether to accept
the transfer or not, and has to choose between two alternatives, as will be explained below. The subjects
are endowed with 40 tokens. The experiment has four treatments depending on the gender of F and PO,
we have ff, mm, fm,a n dmf, being the ﬁrst letter the gender -female, male- of F and the second letter
the gender of PO. The pairs (F and PO) are anonymously matched and remain unchanged throughout the
experiment19. Before entering into the lab, in the mixed sessions, subjects are told that one gender will sit
in one part of the lab and the other gender in the other part, and when the instructions are read aloud they
are told that one gender has one role and the other gender the other role.
16As previouly mentioned, the characteristics of corruption are: the reciprocity between the briber and bribee, the negative
externality over the public, and the probability of being discovered.
17As will be explained below, every time that a corrupt behavior is being carried out by a couple, both members of all the
other couples in the lab are penalized.
18The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999).
19A long term relation between the ﬁrm and the public oﬃcer is represented.
8Stage 1 F has to decide whether to send some tokens to PO or not. If F decides to send, the experiment
moves to stage 2, if not to stage 4.
Stage 2 F has to decide how many tokens t to transfer. If F sends any positive amount, he/she has to pay
a ﬁxed transfer cost of 2 tokens20. For simplicity, t is deﬁned in integer numbers, and small enough to be
sure that F will not end with a negative payoﬀ, therefore t ∈ {1,2,...,10}. The experiment moves to stage 3.
After F (Player 1) decides whether to oﬀer a transfer or not and how much, F is asked with which
probability he/she thinks his partner (PO) will accept the transfer and in case of accepting it, with which
probability he/she thinks PO would choose alternative B (the "corrupt" alternative).
Stage 3 PO has to decide if to accept or not the tokens transferred by F. If he/she does, he receives 3t 21,
and an integer (n) between 0 and 999 is randomly chosen, and if n<3, then the pair is disqualiﬁed from
the experiment, and if n > 3, then the experiment moves to stage 4. If PO decides to reject the transfer,
then the experiment moves to stage 4.
Stage 4 PO has to decide between diﬀerent alternatives.
i) If PO has accepted the transfer, he/she has to decide between alternative A and B. Alternative A is the




Firm 47 67 46 66 45 65 44 64 43 63 42 62 41 61 40 60 39 59 38 58
P u b l i c  O f f i c e r 5 34 85 65 15 95 46 25 76 56 06 86 37 16 67 46 97 77 28 07 5
91 0 12345678
Table 1: Payoﬀs if PO accepts the transfer
The payoﬀs are calculated as follows.




10 if A is chosen by PO








10 if A is chosen by PO




20The tranfer cost represents the cost to F to approach PO; it is independent from the fact whether PO accepts the transfer
or not.
21T h en u m b e ro ft o k e n si st r i p l e dt os h o wt h ed i ﬀerence in marginal utility between the ﬁrm (the briber) and the public
oﬃcer; it is assumed that the income as a public oﬃcer is lower than the income obtained in private business as a ﬁrm.
9Where Pi is the payoﬀ of player i ∈ {F,PO}, E is the initial endowment (40 tokens), c is the transfer
cost (2 tokens), and t the amount of tokens transferred.
The payoﬀ of PO is higher in alternative A than in B to reﬂect the fact that to carry out a corrupt
alternative PO would have to incur in some costs, for example, to hide some information from his/her
superiors. When alternative B is chosen, 3 tokens are discounted from the earnings of all the other subjects
in the lab. This represents the negative externality that corruption has over the public22. The minimum
possible discount that a subject can have is 0 if no pair (apart from his own) choose alternative B, and g−1
if all other pairs choose alternative B, being g the number of total pairs in the lab. In 3 out of 4 sessions
there are 13 couples in the room, in the remaining session there are 12 couples23.
ii) If PO rejects the transfer, he has to decide between alternative A and C. Alternative C implies a costly
punishment to the F24. The payoﬀs can be seen in the following table.
AC
Firm 48 36
Public Officer 50 48
Table 2: Payoﬀs if PO rejects the transfer
The payoﬀs for this case are calculated using the equations below.
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10 if A is chosen by PO




The payoﬀs when alternative A is chosen are the same as in case i with t =0 .W h e nCi sc h o s e n ,P O
pays 2 tokens to punish F with 12 tokens, that is why PO receives 8 tokens instead of the 10 tokens that he
receives when choosing A, and F receives −2 instead of 10.
iii) If F does not send any amount, then PO has to decide between alternative A and B. The payoﬀsf o r
this case are deﬁned in the following table. They are the same as in the ﬁrst case but with c and t equal to
0. Again, when alternative B is chosen, 3 tokens are discounted from the earnings of all the other subjects
in the lab.
22A sh a sb e e ns t a t e di nm a n yp a p e r s ,c o r r u p t i o nh a sar e l a t i o nw i t hc r i m e( c o r r u p t i o na n dc r i m ea r ep o s i t i v e l yc o r r e l a t e d ) ,
economic development (they are negatively correlated), international business (they are negatively correlated), etc. See Trans-
parency International’s annual reports.
23Due to technical problems in the computer room.
24I introduced the possibility of punishing F by PO -when PO rejects the transfer- to reﬂe c tt h ef a c tt h a tFh a st om a k ea n




Public Officer 50 45
Table 3: Payoﬀs if F does not transfer any token
When they are caught -the randomly chosen number n is lower than 3- both subjects are excluded from
the experiment and receive 0 payoﬀ, apart from the show-up fee. In this case the subjects are asked to
complete a questionnaire, and to persuade them to remain in the lab and do it, an extra payment of 2 euros
is oﬀered in the moment they know that they are disqualiﬁed.
At the end of each round subjects are informed only about the payoﬀ they obtain due to their own
decisions, i.e. they are not informed about the deductions due to other couples choosing alternative B until
the end of the 20 rounds. It was done like this to maintain the independence between the couples.
The ﬁnal payoﬀs are calculated as the sum of all periods’ payoﬀs converted into euros, the rate of
conversion is 1.5 euros for 100 tokens, plus the show-up fee (3 euros).
After the 20 rounds are over, a questionnaire is distributed. In this questionnaire, using the modiﬁed
version of Datta Gupta et al. (2005) of the psychometric test in Weber et al. (2002), subjects were asked
to rate the likelihood that they would engage in 16 risky activities, on a 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely)
scale. The sum of the answers gives the degree of risk loving of the subjects, the higher the sum the higher
t h ed e g r e eo fr i s kl o v i n g .
3R e s u l t s
In this section the results of the experiment are analyzed. First of all, table 4 shows the number of subjects
and average earnings in each one of the sessions25. As can be seen, average earnings are similar among the
diﬀerent sessions, with a total average of 16.91 euros. This earnings include the show-up fee of 3 euros. No
pair was disqualiﬁed in any session.
Table 4: Number of subjects and average earnings
25As said before, the ﬁrst letter corresponds to the gender of the ﬁrst player (male or female) and the second letter corresponds
to the gender of the second player.
11The rest of the section is organized as follows. In subsection 3.1 the results for Player 1 are analyzed,
while the results for Player 2 are analyzed in subsection 3.2. Finally, in subsection 3.3 some regressions
related to Players 1’ and Players 2’ decisions are presented.
3.1 Results for the Firm - Player 1
A ss h o w ni nt a b l e4,t h en u m b e ro fP l a y e r s1i s13 in the fm, mm, and ff sessions and 12 in the mf session,
therefore there are 25 male and 26 female Players 1.
The ﬁrst player had to decide, ﬁrst of all, if to oﬀer a transfer to Player 2, and if yes how many tokens
to oﬀer. This decisions are what will be analyzed in this subsection.
RESULT 1: On average, women oﬀered a transfer less frequently than men.
The percentage of men that decided to oﬀer a transfer at least once is 80% and the percentage of women
is 65%. Moreover, the average number of transfers is statistically diﬀerent and smaller for women (3.1 out
of 20 periods, 15%)t h a nf o rm e n( 6 out of 20 periods, it is 30% of the periods).26
Men oﬀered a transfer to men in 26% of the periods (5.2 times) while the percentage when playing with
women is 35% (7 times). The percentage of women is 17% (3.4 times) and 14% (2.8 times) respectively.
For those that decided to oﬀer a transfer, we have in the next ﬁgure the histogram of transfer oﬀers. As
can be seen, for the lower amounts, the frequency of cases for women is higher than the frequency for men27.
The peak in 6 tokens may be explained by the fact that transferring this amount, and Player 2 choosing





















Figure 1: Histogram of transfer oﬀers
26Either following a Mann-Whitney U test or a t-test to compare means. This tests are used from now on when comparing
means.
27In this ﬁgure all the cases are being considered, it means all Players 1 in all the periods.
12RESULT 2: The average transfer oﬀered by women is statistically diﬀerent and lower that the average
transfer oﬀered by men.
The average transfer -conditional on being positive- oﬀered by men is 4.72 tokens and by women 2.60
tokens, and they are statistically diﬀerent28.
Men are oﬀering on average 5.16 tokens to male Players 2 and 4.19 tokens to female Players 2, and women
3.19 and 2.07 tokens respectively. The average amount oﬀered in Abbink et al.(2002) is 5.68 tokens, higher
than 3.75 which is the average in my experiment taking together both sexes.
In this experiment, where subjects are playing together for 20 periods, Player 2 can reciprocate Player 1
by choosing alternative B, but also Player 1 can reciprocate Player 2’s previous period behavior, by oﬀering
more tokens after he/she has chosen alternative B. This is observed in my experiment, the average transfer
a f t e rP l a y e r2h a sc h o s e na l t e r n a t i v eAi s0.47 and after he has chosen alternative B is 3.87 tokens29.
The next ﬁgures show the frequency of transfers and the average transfer -conditional on being positive-
by period.
In ﬁgure 2 one can see again that the frequency of cases in which men make a transfer is higher than the
frequency for women, and from ﬁgure 3 it is clear that -with the exception of period 2 and 11- the amount
































































Figures 2 and 3: Frequency of tranfers and average tranfer by period
As was explained before, after each time F (Player 1) decided whether to oﬀer a transfer or not and how
much, F was asked with which probability he/she thought his partner (PO) would accept the transfer and
in case of accepting it, with which probability he/she thought PO would choose alternative B. Men assigned
28Following either a Mann-Whitney U test or a t-test to compare means.
29Not conditional on being positive, it means that it includes zero transfers. The average transfer after a C choice is 1 token,
but it is based only on 7 observations.
13ad i ﬀerent and higher probability to both events -0.78 and 0.57-t h a nw o m e n- 0.64 and 0.25-30. The average
assigned probability to a male Player 2 accepting the transfer is 0.72 and for a woman is 0.70,a n dt h e
average probability that a man chose alternative B was 0.46 and for a woman was 0.38.
The assigned probability to Player 2 accepting the transfer, by a male Player 1 was 0.72 when he was
playing with a male and 0.84 when he was playing with a female, and the average assigned probabilities by
af e m a l eP l a y e r1w e r e0.72 and 0.56 respectively. The average probability that men assigned to Player 2
choosing alternative B was 0.56 when they were playing with men and 0.57 when they were playing with
women. The probabilities assigned by women were 0.32 and 0.19, respectively.
It is interesting to notice that men assigned a higher probability to women accepting the transfer (0.84)
than to men (0.72) and (almost) the same probability of choosing alternative B, while the average transfer
oﬀered is higher for males than for females (5.16 and 4.19 respectively). A possible explanation for this is
that men thought that women would consider a smaller amount "enough" to be accepted and to convince
her to choose alternative B.
3.2 Results for the Public Oﬃcer - Player 2
The number of Players 2 is 13 in the fm,mm, and ff sessions and 12 in the mf session, therefore there are
26 male and 25 female Players 2.
The decisions the second player has to make depend on whether Player 1 has decided to send tokens or
not. If he decided to send, then Player 2’s ﬁrst decision is whether to accept it or not. Then, Player 2 has
to decide between diﬀerent alternatives, as was explained in section 2. If Player 1 decided not to oﬀer a
transfer, then Player 2 only has to choose one of the two alternatives.
RESULT 3: The frequency with which women accepted a transfer is smaller than the frequency for men.
The percentage of male Players 1 that received at least one transfer oﬀer is 73%, and this value for women
is 72%. When receiving an oﬀer, the average frequency of acceptance is 76% for men and 58% for women.
Moreover, the frequency with which women accepted the oﬀer is 95% when she was playing with a male
Player 1 and 49% when Player 1 was a woman, these percentages are statistically diﬀerent. The frequency
with which men accepted the oﬀer when they were playing with a male Player 1 is 61% a n dw h e nP l a y e r1
was a woman it was 68%, but these percentages are not statistically diﬀerent.
RESULT 4: Once accepting a transfer, women chose less frequently alternative B than men.
30The average probability assigned by men and women are statistically diﬀerent in both cases, either following a Mann-
Whitney U test or a t-test.
14When the transfer was accepted, men chose alternative B in 52% of the cases and women did it in 27% of
the cases, percentages statistically diﬀerent 31. The average percentage of cases when men chose alternative
B when they were playing with another man is 67% and the percentage is 37% when they were playing with
a woman. The percentages for women are 33% and 19% respectively.
It is interesting to notice that the highest frequency of B choices is observed when only men are playing
(67%) while the lowest when only women are playing (19%) .
As said above, Player 1 was asked to assign a probability to the event that his/her partner would accept
the transfer and if he/she did, Player 1 was asked to assign a probability to Player 2’s choice of alternative B.
It turns out that the average assigned probabilities were very close to the real frequencies, with the exception
when men where playing as Players 1 and women as Players 2. In this case men assigned a probability of
women choosing alternative B of 0.57 while the real frequency was 0.33.
Figures 4 and 5 show the frequency of B choices by period and by the amount transferred for those that
accepted the transfer.
In ﬁgure 4 one can see that, with the exception of periods 1, 10, 14 and 19, the frequency is higher for
m e nt h a nf o rw o m e n .I nﬁgure 5 we can see that the frequencies follow the same pattern, it means that it
is higher for men than for women, with the exception of 9 tokens, because no man received an oﬀer of 9










































































Figures 4 and 5: Frequency of B choices by period and by amount transferred
3.3 Estimations
Decisions of F - Player 1 The data consist of observations of subjects’ decisions repeated over the time.
This repetition of observations of the subjects should be taken into account when estimating. There are two
alternative ways of doing so. The ﬁrst one is to estimate a model using a random-eﬀects speciﬁcation and
the second one is to regress the model clustering the observations by subject. The ﬁrst alternative is more
31Following either a Mann-Whitney U test or a t-test to compare means.
15powerful while the second one is more conservative. Therefore, with a random-eﬀects speciﬁcation not very
strong relations may result in signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, while with the second alternative a real relation may
be rejected. For that reason the results of the two diﬀerent ways of estimating the models are reported.
Players 1’ ﬁrst decision analyzed is the decision of sending a transfer and I estimated a random-eﬀects
probit and a probit with clustered standard error32. The results are shown in table 5.
The dependent variable takes value 1 if the subject decides to oﬀer a transfer and 0 otherwise. The
independent variables in Estimations 1 and 3 are the gender of F -Player 1- (SEX in the table) that takes
value 1 if Player 1 is a woman and 0 otherwise; the gender of PO -Player 2- a dummy variable that takes
value 1 if Player 2 is a woman and 0 otherwise (SEXP2); an interaction term between both genders (S1∗S2)
; two dummy variables referring to Player 2’s behavior in the previous period, the ﬁrst one (BT)t a k e sv a l u e
1 if in the previous period PO chose alternative B after F has oﬀered a transfer and 0 otherwise, and the
second variable (BNT) takes value 1 if in the previous period PO chose alternative B after F has not oﬀered
at r a n s f e ra n d0o t h e r w i s e .
Finally, two variables referring to the risk aversion of the subjects are included. The degree of risk
aversion can inﬂuence the decision because it implies a risk, with a probability of 0.003 the subjects may
be disqualiﬁed from the experiment33 and earn 0 euros apart from the show-up fee. The variable RLWOM
reﬂects the degree of risk loving of women and RLMEN of men. As explained before, the degree of risk
loving was measured using the modiﬁed version of Datta Gupta el al. (2005) of the psychometric test in
Weber et al. (2002), in the post experiment questionnaire. In Estimations 2 and 4 instead of including BT
and BNT,t h ev a r i a b l e sPAB and PAC were included, the ﬁrst one takes value 1 if in the previous period
Player 2 has chosen alternative B and 0 otherwise, while the variable PAC takes value one if C was chosen
and 0 otherwise.
The variables reﬂecting previous period Player 2’s decision were included because in this repeated game
not only Player 2 can reciprocate Player 1 by choosing alternative B, but also Player 1 can reciprocate Player
2’s previous period behavior by deciding to oﬀer (more) tokens after he/she has chosen alternative B. In
estimations 1 and 3 it was also taken into account if the election of alternative B was as a reply of Player 1’s
sending of tokens or Player 2 chose alternative B to show to Player 1 that he/she was willing to "cooperate"
or start a "corrupt" relation.
32I also estimated random-eﬀects logit and logit with clustered standard errors but the results are not reported here given
that they are very similar to the ones reported below.
33If Player 2 accepts the transfer oﬀered by Player 1.
16Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 Estimation 4
SEX -4.659** -6.406*** -1.542 -1.682
(1.882) (1.767) (1.520) (1.554)
SEXP2 -0.088 0.549*** 0.447 0.427
(0.267) (0.214) (0.325) (0.337)
S1*S2 0.612 0.056 -0.307 -0.286





RLWOM 0.111** 0.125*** 0.043 0.045*
(0.036) (0.033) (0.027) (0.027)
RLMEN 0.014 -0.009 0.009 0.009





Constant -2.048** -1.053 -1.631* -1.616*
(0.918) (0.726) (0.918) (0.922)
Nb of observations 969 969 969 969
Nb of groups 51 51
Obs per group 19 19
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*** significant at 1 percent level
** significant at 5 percent level
* significant at 10 percent level
Standard errors in parenthesis
Dep variable: Send (=1 if subject offers a transfer, 0 otherwise)
Random-effects Clustering
Table 5: Probit regressions for the send decision
The number of observations is the product of 51 Players 1 playing 19 times34.
Gender of Player 1 In estimations 1 and 2 the gender of F is an important determinant of the probability
of sending a transfer, its negative sign implies that the probability is lower if the player is a woman. In
estimations 3 and 4 it has negative sign too, but it is not statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, we can conclude
that it has a negative eﬀect although we can not say that it is very strong.
Gender of Player 2 The variables related with the gender of Player 2 are not signiﬁcant in Estimations
1, 3, and 4, suggesting that Player 1 does not take into account the gender of PO when deciding whether
to oﬀer a transfer or not. In Estimation 2 the variable SEXP2 is signiﬁcant, but the total eﬀect of playing
with a woman is very close to 035.
Player 2’s previous period decision The variables BT and BNT have positive signs and are highly
signiﬁcant, meaning that, if PO has chosen alternative B in the previous period, then the probability of
34The data for the ﬁrst period is excluded to have complete data for all the included independent variables, given that BT,
BNT, PAB,a n dPAC do not have data for the ﬁrst period.
35It is not directly seen in the coeﬃcient of the variable SEXP2 because to calculate the total eﬀect all the signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients are taken into account. The total eﬀect of playing with a female Player 2 is 0.0013 for a man and 0.0017 for a
woman following the results of estimation 2. According to estimations 1, 3 and 4 the total eﬀect is 0.
17oﬀering a transfer in the current period is higher, in both cases. Estimations 2 and 4 show that if Player 2
has chosen alternative B in the previous period, the probability that Player 1 oﬀers a transfer is higher, as it
can be concluded also from estimations 1 and 3. However, if Player 2 has chosen alternative C, it does not
aﬀect the probability of Player 1 oﬀe r i n gat r a n s f e r 36. The omitted variable is Player 2 choosing alternative
A.
Risk aversion The degree of risk aversion is a determinant of the probability of sending a transfer for
women but not for men. Its level of signiﬁcance is between 1% in Estimation 2 and 11% in Estimation 3. The
more risk loving she is, the higher the probability of oﬀering a transfer to PO. In their paper, Datta Gupta
et al. (2005) ﬁnd that the degree of risk aversion only inﬂuences the decision of women but not the decision
of men37. In my case, as in their case, the degree of risk loving is not statistically diﬀerent between genders,
but the average degree of risk loving of the women that oﬀered transfer is 45.68, higher than the average
for those that did not oﬀer (43.14). Those numbers for men are 44.80 and 43.83, values not statistically
diﬀerent.
The focus is on the determinants of oﬀering a transfer given that the interest of the paper is to see if
women and men behave in the same way with respect to bribery. It is not estimated a model for those
that decided not to oﬀer a transfer, but from previous results we can understand this attitude responded
to three main motives. The ﬁrst one may be that the subject is highly risk averse and wants to avoid the
probability of being disqualiﬁed, the second possible explanation may be that he/she is waiting for a "signal
of cooperation" from Player 2, i.e. choosing Alternative B. Finally, the subject may not want to start a
relation where other subjects can be damaged. This last reason, I believe, is correlated with the gender of
the subject.
The second decision, for those that decided to oﬀer a transfer, was to decide how many tokens
to oﬀer. A OLS model was estimated, where the dependent variable is the amount oﬀered38,a n dt h e
independent ones are the same used before with the exception of the risk loving degree, given that the risk
of being disqualiﬁed is independent of the amount transferred, and therefore the risk aversion of a subject
should not inﬂuence the amount transferred, conditional on being positive. The results are in table 6.
36Only in 7 cases alternative C was chosen.
37As said before, in their case the decision was to choose between a competitive payment scheme (tournament) and a non-
competitive one (piece rate payment).
38A tobit model was also estimated and yielded very similar results.
18Estimation 5 Estimation 6 Estimation 7 Estimation 8
SEX -2.259** -2.183** -1.678** -1.644**
(0.990) (0.971) (0.849) (0.830)
SEXP2 -1.561* -1.518* -1.259 -1.259
(0.929) (0.911) (0.936) (0.929)
S1*S2 0.585 0.545 0.800 0.803









Constant 5.481*** 5.494*** 4.902*** 4.879***
(0.687) (0.675) (0.582) (0.579)
Nb of observations 214 214 214 214
Nb of groups 35 35
Avrg obs per group 6.1 6.1
Prob>chi2 (Prob>F) 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.000
*** significant at 1 percent level
** significant at 5 percent level
* significant at 10 percent level
Standard errors in parenthesis
Random-effects Clustering
Dependent variable: Amount transferred
Table 6: OLS regressions for the amount transferred
Gender of Player 1 Again, the gender has an eﬀect on the amount oﬀered. The oﬀer is lower if Player 1
is a woman.
Gender of Player 2 This variable is signiﬁcant when a random-eﬀects model was estimated, yielding a
negative sign meaning that if Player 2 is a woman, the amount transferred is lower, for both male and female
Players 1.
Player 2’s previous period decision In this case, when a random-eﬀects model was estimated, only the
variable BNT is signiﬁcant, while the variable BT is not. The positive sign means that the amount oﬀered is
higher if in the previous period Player 2 has chosen alternative B after no transfer, that can be interpreted as
a signal of Player 2 to his/her partner that he/she is willing to "cooperate". When a clustering speciﬁcation
was estimated, also the variable BNT was signiﬁcant with a positive coeﬃcient. In Estimations 6 and 8 the
variable PAB is signiﬁcant while PAC is not The non signiﬁcance of the second variable coincides with the
results above (Estimations 2 and 4). The positive sign of PAB is explained by the same reasons as the sign
of BT and BNT, it is a reciprocity between the players.
It can be concluded that if Player 1 is a woman, the probability of starting a corrupt relation is lower,
and the amount transferred (the bribe) is also lower.
Decisions of PO - Player 2 The decisions that are going to be studied are those that imply a corrupt
relation between the subjects, it means after Player 1 has oﬀered a transfer as a way to start this relation.
19In this case, Player 2 (PO) has to take two decisions. The ﬁrst one is whether to accept the transfer oﬀer or
not, and the second one is which alternative to choose. The results are in table 7.
For the ﬁrst decision, the number of observations is constrained to Player 1’s decision of sending a
transfer39. The dependent variable takes value 1 if Player 2 accepts the transfer and 0 otherwise. The
estimated models are a random-eﬀects probit and probit with clustered standard errors40.
In estimations 9-12 the variable SEX represents the gender of the second player, given that his/her
decisions are the ones being analyzed now. The second variable is the gender of Player 1 (SEXP1), and the
third variable is an interactive variable between the gender of Player 1 and Player 2 (S1∗S2). The variable
TRANSFER represents the amount oﬀered as a transfer. The last two variables refer to the psychometric
test measuring the degree of risk loving, explained before. They are included here because the decision of
accepting the transfer implies a risk, if Player 2 accepts the transfer then a number is randomly chosen
deciding if the couple is disqualiﬁed or not.
Dependent variable: 
Random effects Clustering Random effects Clustering
Estimation 9 Estimation 10 Estimation 11 Estimation 12
SEX -4.530 -3.690* -0.768** -0.713**
(3.168) (2.143) (0.325) (0.324)
SEXP1 1.262** -0.053 -0.295 -0.221
(0.607) (0.570) (0.389) (0.357)
S1*S2 -3.504*** -1.124* -0.013 -0.085
(0.929) (0.648) (0.603) (0.548)
TRANSFER 0.464** 0.123* 0.244*** 0.251***





Constant 0.500 2.292** -0.661* -0.699***
(1.752) (1.108) (0.275) (0.394)
Nb of observations 232 232 190 190
Nb of groups 37 29
Avrg obs per group 6.3 6.6
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
*** significant at 1 percent level
** significant at 5 percent level
* significant at 10 percent level
Standard errors in parenthesis
Accept (=1 if transfer is accepted) Alternative B (=1 if B chosen)
Table 7: Probit regressions for the transfer acceptance and alternative choice
Gender of Player 2 The gender of PO is statistically signiﬁcant at 15% level in Estimation 9 and at 10%
level in Estimation 10. Its negative sign means that the probability of accepting the transfer is lower if PO
is a woman.
39I n2 3 2c a s e sP l a y e r1d e c i d e dt oo ﬀe rat r a n s f e rt oP l a y e r2 .
40I tw a sa l s oe s t i m a t e dar a n d o m - e ﬀects logit and a logit model with clustered standard errors but the results are not reported
here given that they are very similar to the ones reported.
20Gender of Player 1 The eﬀect of playing with a female Player 1 is negative but small for a female Player
2 and almost 0 for a male Player 241.
Amount transferred The eﬀect of the amount transferred is the expected one, the higher the amount the
higher the probability of being accepted.
Risk loving As in the sending decision of Player 1, the degree of risk loving inﬂuences only the decision
of women, although it is only signiﬁcant in Estimation 9. As expected, the higher the degree of risk loving,
the higher the probability of accepting the transfer. The average risk loving degree of those women that
accepted a transfer (43.96) is higher than the degree of those that rejected it (39.64). For men it happens
the opposite, the average risk loving degree of those that accepted the transfer is 40.45 and of those that
rejected the transfer is 43.71.T h i si sr e ﬂected in the negative sign of the variable RLMEN.
Given the previous results, it can be deduced that the rejection of the transfer oﬀered may be due to the
fact that the subject is against the acceptance of a "bribe" to manipulate his/her decisions, or the transfer
oﬀered was not "enough" for him/her, or it was a matter of risk aversion.
Once Player 2 decided to accept the transfer (or reject it), he/she has to decide which alternative to
choose. As explained above, I am concentrated in the case where the "corrupt" relation is established, that
is why I only analyze the alternative chosen when PO accepts the transfer or "bribe". A random-eﬀects
probit model and a probit model with clustered standard errors were estimated, where the dependent variable
takes value 1 if alternative B is chosen, and 0 if alternative A is chosen. The results are also in table 7.
The independent variables are the same used above excluding the degree of risk loving given that the
alternative chosen does not modify the risk of being disqualiﬁed, and therefore the risk aversion should not
inﬂuence this decision.
Gender of Player 2 The gender of Player 2 has a negative impact meaning that if PO is a woman, the
probability of choosing alternative B is smaller.
Gender of Player 1 The gender of Player 1 is not statistically signiﬁcant, neither the interaction term.
Amount transferred The positive sign of the variable TRANSFER implies that the higher the amount
transferred the higher the probability of choosing alternative B.
As a result of the previous estimations, it can be said that if Player 2 is a woman, then the probability of
accepting the transfer (bribe) is lower and the probability of choosing the corrupt alternative is lower.
41The total eﬀect of playing with a female Player 1 is 0 for a man and −0.007 for a woman following the results of estimation
9, and 0 and −0.043 respectively, following the results of estimation 10.
214C o n c l u s i o n s
The aim of this paper is to study in a controlled environment whether women and men behave in diﬀerent
ways with respect to corruption, as suggested in the papers using ﬁeld data. In the experiment participants
take one of two roles, that of a ﬁrm or that of a public oﬃcer. The possibility of corruption is introduced by
allowing the ﬁrst player (the ﬁrm) to send some amount of money to the second player (the public oﬃcer)
in the hope of persuading the oﬃcer to take a decision favorable to the former, although this decision has
negative externalities over all the other participants in the experiment.
The percentage of male Players 1 (Firm) that decided to oﬀer a transfer (bribe) to Player 2 (Public
oﬃcer) at least once is 80% while the percentage of female Players 1 that did it is 65%.M o r e o v e r , t h e
average number of transfers is 6 for men and 3.1 for women, quantities statistically diﬀerent. The average
amounts oﬀered -conditional on being positive- are also statistically diﬀerent, they are 4.72 and 2.60 for male
and female Players 1, respectively.
The average frequencies of transfer acceptance are 76% and 58% for male and female Players 2, respec-
tively. When the transfer was accepted, in 52% of the cases men chose alternative B and women did it in
27% of the cases; this percentages are statistically diﬀerent. The higher average percentage of B choices was
observed when only men were playing (67%) while the lowest was observed when only women were playing
(19%).
The estimations show that if Player 1 (Firm) is a woman, the probability of sending money is lower
but this relation is signiﬁcant under the random-eﬀects model but not under the clustering speciﬁcation.
The amount transferred is lower if Player 1 is a woman in both speciﬁcations. These results imply that the
probability of starting a corrupt relation is lower. If Player 2 (Public oﬃcer) is a woman, the probability of
accepting the transfer or bribe is lower, and this relation is signiﬁcant at a 15% level in the random-eﬀects
model and at 10% in the clustering speciﬁcation. The probability of choosing the corrupt alternative is lower
if Player 2 is a woman in both models.
Given the results mentioned above, the conclusion is in line with the ﬁeld-data papers, meaning that
women are less corrupt than men, and therefore, it can be expected that increasing women participation in
the labor force and politics would help to ﬁght corruption.
One explanation of the gender diﬀerence in crime -according to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990)- is a
diﬀerence in self-control, it is "the extend to which they are vulnerable to the temptations of the moment"
or "the extend to which they are restrained from criminal acts". This motion can also be applied to diﬀerences
in corruption. This would mean that women have more self-control and this is a reason why they refrain from
committing corruption. Moreover, as Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) point out, people with low self-control
tend to be more egocentric and not interested in the others’ needs. In relation with corruption, one possible
explanation for the observed diﬀerence in the experiment is that women are more sensitive to others’ losses
22and that is why they choose less frequently the corrupt alternative -that has negative externalities over all
the other participants. Other possible reason is that they behave like they did to follow the gender stereotype
that women should be more concerned about the others. These hypothesis cannot be conﬁrmed or rejected
with the data that was obtained from the experiment. To arrive to a conclusion of why the gender diﬀerence
is observed, more studies should be conducted on this subject.
This paper is an attempt to study gender diﬀerences in corruption through a lab experiment. Future
research can shed more light on this topic.
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255 Appendix: Instructions
(Original text in Spanish)
Thank you for coming to this decision making experiment. You will be paid 3 euros for showing up plus
the money you earn during the experiment which will depend on your and other participants’ decisions. At
the end of today’s session you will be privately paid for your decisions.
From now on it is not allowed the communication with other participants. If you have any doubt during
the reading of this instructions or in any moment of the experiment, rise your hand and you will be personally
attended.
There are two types of participants in the experiment: player type 1 (called Player 1) and player type 2
(called Player 2). Players 1 are those that have an odd number and Players 2 those that have an even number.
At the beginning of the experiment, each Player 1 will be matched with one Player 2 in an anonymous way,
and this matching will be maintained during the whole experiment.
The experiment consists of 20 identical and independent rounds, and each round consists of 4 stages
which will be explained in the following. At the beginning of each round, each participant will be assigned
40 tokens, meaning that he has this 40 tokens to be used in this round.
Stage 1
Player 1 has to decide whether to send a transfer to Player 2 or not.
• If he does, his credit is reduced by 2 tokens (it is a ﬁxed cost for transferring tokens) and the experiment
moves to stage 2.
• If Player 1 decides not to send a transfer to Player 2, his credit remain unchanged, and the experiment
moves to stage 4.
Stage 2
Player 1 decides on how many tokens to transfer to Player 2 between 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, or 10 tokens.
The experiment moves to stage 3.
Stage 3
Player 2 decides on whether to accept the transfer or not.
• If he decides to accept, then his credit is reduced by the amount transferred, and Player 2’s credit is
increased by the tripled amount that is transferred by Player 1. For example, if Player 1 sends 2 tokens,
Player 2 receives 6 tokens. In the following, an integer out of the range from 0 to 999 is randomly
drawn by the computer (every number has the same probability of being chosen).
26— If the randomly drawn number is 0, 1, or 2, then the couple is disqualiﬁed. That means: The
experiment ends for these two players, and their earnings in the experiment are 0, they receive
only 3 euros for showing up. These players have to remain in their place in silence and ﬁll in a
questionnaire that will be distributed. For the other participants, the experiment is continued
normally.
— If the randomly drawn number is 3, 4, 5, ...or 999, then the experiment moves to stage 4.
• If he decides not to accept the transfer that Player 1 is oﬀering, then the credits remain unchanged
(the transfer cost from stage 1, however, is also paid). The experiment moves to stage 4.
Stage 4
Player 2 chooses one of the alternatives, the options depends on what has happened until the moment,
i.e. if Player 1 has transferred tokens and if in case of doing it, if Player 2 has accepted the transfer or not.
1. If Player 1 decided not to transfer tokens, Player 2 chooses one of the alternatives A and B
2. If Player 1 oﬀered a transfer that was accepted by Player 2, then Player 2 chooses one of the alternatives
Aa n dB
3. If Player 1 oﬀered a transfer that was rejected by Player 2, then Player 2 chooses one of the alternatives
Aa n dC .
This can be seen in the following table.
Alternatives
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4
Player 1 Player 1 Player 2 Player 2
Decides not to send tokens ------- ------- A or B
Decides to send tokens Decides the amount of tokens Accepts the tokens A or B
Decides to send tokens Decides the amount of tokens Does not accept the tokens A or C
Situation
Apart from the corresponding payoﬀs in each situation that will be speciﬁed in the following tables,
for each couple that chooses Alternative B (i.e. for each Player 2 that do it) the payoﬀ of all the other
participants will be decreased by 3 tokens. These 3 tokens are not included in the following tables.
CASE 1
Player 1 decided not to oﬀer a transfer of tokens. The payoﬀs are the following.
27AB
Player 1 50 70
Player 2 50 45
This means that if Player 2 chooses Alternative A, the payoﬀs are 50 tokens for both players. If, on the
contrary, Alternative B is chosen, the payoﬀs are 70 tokens for Player 1 and 45 for Player 2. If Alternative
B is chosen, 3 tokens will be deduced from the payoﬀs of all the other couples in the room. The quantities
in the table are the payoﬀs of this round, they include the initial tokens (40), and the added tokens for each
chosen alternative.
CASE 2
P l a y e r1d e c i d e dt oo ﬀer a transfer of tokens and it was accepted by Player 2. In this case the payoﬀs
depend on the amount transferred. The quantities in the following table are the payoﬀso ft h i sr o u n do ft h e
experiment, they include the initial tokens (40), the added tokens for each chosen alternative, the transfer
made, and the cost of doing the transfer.
Transfer
ABABABABABABABABABAB
P l a y e r  1 4 76 74 66 64 56 54 46 44 36 34 26 24 16 14 06 03 95 93 85 8
P l a y e r  2 5 34 85 65 15 95 46 25 76 56 06 86 37 16 67 46 97 77 28 07 5
91 0 5678 1234
For example,
• If 2 tokens are transferred and Alternative A is chosen, the payoﬀs are 46 tokens to Player 1 and 56
tokens to Player 2. If Alternative B is chosen, then the payoﬀs are 66 and 51 tokens respectively. If
Alternative B is chosen, 3 tokens will be deduced from the payoﬀs of each participant of all the other
couples in the room.
• If 5 tokens are transferred and Alternative A is chosen, the payoﬀs are 43 tokens to Player 1 and 65
tokens to Player 2. If Alternative B is chosen, then the payoﬀs are 63 and 60 tokens respectively. If
Alternative B is chosen, 3 tokens will be deduced from the payoﬀs of each participant of all the other
couples in the room.
• If 10 tokens are transferred and Alternative A is chosen, the payoﬀs are 38 tokens to Player 1 and 80
tokens to Player 2. If Alternative B is chosen, then the payoﬀs are 58 and 75 tokens respectively. If
Alternative B is chosen, 3 tokens will be deduced from the payoﬀs of each participant of all the other
couples in the room.
28CASE 3
Player 1 oﬀered a transfer that was rejected by Player 2. In this case the payoﬀs are the following.
AC
Player 1 48 36
Player 2 50 48
It means that, if Player 2 chooses Alternative A, the payoﬀs are 48 tokens to Player 1 and 50 tokens to
Player 2. If Alternative C is chosen, the payoﬀs are 36 tokens to Player 1 and 48 tokens to Player 2. The
mentioned quantities are the payoﬀs of this round of the experiment, they include the initial tokens (40),
the added or deduced tokens for each chosen alternative, and the cost of doing a transfer.
DEDUCTIONS
From the previous payoﬀs we should deduce an amount depending on how many players type 2 have
chosen Alternative B. For each Player 2 of the other couples that chooses Alternative B, we should deduce 3
tokens from the payoﬀs. For example, if there are 5 couples (excluding yours) that have chosen Alternative
B, then from your payoﬀs (and from your partner’s payoﬀs) we have to deduce 15 tokens (5 couples * 3
tokens).
The minimum deduction is 0 (if none of the other couples chooses Alternative B), and the maximum
deduction is 3 times the number of couples that are now in the room (your couple is not counted). For
example, if there are 13 couples in the room, it means 12 couples apart from your couple, then the maximum
possible deduction is 3 * 12 = 36 tokens.
After stage 4, the round ends. The total earnings of the experiment are the sum of the obtained payoﬀs
in all the 20 rounds converted into euros plus the 3 euros for showing up. The exchange rate is 1.5 € for
100 tokens. Each obtained token is worth 1.5 cents, it means that the total earnings is the amount of tokens
multiplied by 0.015. This quantity will be communicated to you at the end of the experiment.
NOTE
The quantity to be deduced from your earnings due to the number of couples that have chosen Alternative
B will be communicated at the end of the experiment, when the 20 rounds are over.
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